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EPISTEMIC PEERHOOD IN THE LAW 
R. GEORGE WRIGHT† 
INTRODUCTION 
The quality of discussion and decision making in various 
legal contexts often displays substantial departures from the 
ideal.  This Article points to a useful framework with which to 
understand many such departures.  The framework in question 
also points the way to healthier decision-making processes in the 
law and to more substantively defensible outcomes of such legal 
decision-making processes. 
The framework in question is adopted, with some 
modifications, from what contemporary philosophers refer to as 
the idea of epistemic peer status, or epistemic peerhood.  Very 
roughly, an epistemic peer is a person or group who deserves our 
recognition as a full contributing partner in group deliberation 
and decision making.  After introducing some important decision-
making pathologies in the law, in legal decision making, and in 
public policy making in general, the Article presents the crucial 
idea of epistemic peerhood.1 
In light of the idea of epistemic peerhood, the Article 
proceeds to examine legal decision-making processes in various 
legal contexts.  These contexts include jury deliberation; the role 
more specifically of purported religious authority, including 
appeal to Scripture, in jury deliberation; debate over the merits 
and effects of diversity and affirmative action on university 
campuses and elsewhere; and the division of decision-making 
authority and proper deference as between federal judges and 
administrative agencies.  A concluding section then concisely 
packages some of the results derived therefrom.  The basic 
 
† Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney 
School of Law. 
1 The term “epistemic” here refers merely to ideas such as evidence, reflection, 
deliberation, belief, and ultimate judgment on legal or other matters. More crucially, 
this Article endorses an exceptionally broad and inclusive theory and practice of who 
should count as one’s epistemic peer. 
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theme, and the broad conclusion, is that we would collectively be 
better off if we adopted broader, more inclusive views as to who 
should count as our epistemic peer.  As it turns out, greater 
equality and expansiveness in acknowledging others as our 
epistemic peers generally pays off for all. 
The concept of epistemic peerhood would, of course, be of no 
interest if there were no substantial problems on which it might 
be usefully brought to bear.  As it happens, though, the quality of 
our legal discussion and decision making in various contexts 
should strike us as distinctly imperfect.2  Epistemic peerhood 
issues are intrinsic to this general problem.  For example, merely 
increasing ideological polarization, along with ignorance of and 
disdain for various out groups, often affect our political and legal 
decision making.3  Beyond some point, such enhanced 
polarization and out-group disdain begin to undermine 
fundamental values and institutions, including the rule of law.4 
 
2 For one perspective on an idealized decision-making process, see JURGEN 
HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 133–34 
(Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholson trans., 1995) (1983) (“I speak of 
communicative action when actors are prepared to harmonize their plans of action 
through internal means.”) (emphasis in original). 
3 For social and scientific attempts to account for at least some aspects of 
ideological polarization, see JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD 
PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND RELIGION 100 (2013); JOSHUA GREENE, 
MORAL TRIBES: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE GAP BETWEEN US AND THEM 9–11 
(2014). For brief accounts of Professor Haidt’s main theses, see Gareth Cook, How 
Science Explains America’s Great Moral Divide, SCI. AM. (Oct. 2, 2012), https://www. 
scientificamerican.com/article/how-science-explains-americas-great-moral-divide; 
Samuel McNerney, Jonathan Haidt and the Moral Matrix: Breaking Out of Our 
Righteous Minds, SCI. AM.: GUEST BLOG (Dec. 8, 2011), https://blogs.scientific 
american.com/guest-blog/jonathan-haidt-the-moral-matrix-breaking-out-of-our-
righteous-minds. On the phenomenon of increasing, if not cascading, partisan bias 
and animosity, see, e.g., Ilya Somin, The Disturbing Growth of Partisan Bias, WASH. 
POST (Dec. 9, 2015), www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/12/ 
09/this-is-your-brain (“If you think most supporters of the opposing party are evil or 
stupid, it’s easy to preemptively reject their proposals without giving them any 
serious consideration.”). More broadly, “Parties who disagree about matters that are 
important to them inevitably feel that the disagreement is the result of the other 
party not seeing things objectively and reasonably.” THOMAS GILOVICH & LEE ROSS, 
THE WISEST ONE IN THE ROOM: HOW YOU CAN BENEFIT FROM SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY’S 
MOST POWERFUL INSIGHTS 199 (2016). 
4 For background, see generally R. George Wright, The Magna Carta and the 
Contemporary Rule of Law Problem, 54 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 243 (2016) 
[hereinafter Wright, Magna Carta]; R. George Wright, The Rule of Law: A Currently 
Incoherent Idea That Can Be Redeemed Through Virtue, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1125 
(2015) [hereinafter Wright, The Rule of Law]. 
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The key problem in this regard is that the rule of law is 
largely a public good, the production or the undermining of which 
neither reaps appropriate rewards5 nor pays appropriate 
penalties to discrete groups.6  The basic rule of law cannot simply 
automatically preserve itself. 
Worse, there is no guarantee that political groups will 
always adopt the same tradeoff rate between their own 
undermining of the rule of law and the further promotion of their 
own distinctive political goals.  The latter goals, in an era of 
intensifying polarization, may take on greater priority over any 
incremental damage to the rule of law.7  Our broad legal decision-
making patterns in this regard may thus intensify the collective 
pathology of what is called a “Prisoner’s Dilemma.”8  We may all 
depend upon a basic underlying rule of law, but still find 
ourselves disinclined to do what is necessary to preserve it over 
the long term. 
Thus, a legal system with mutual group disdain and lack of 
mutual respect still crucially depends upon a sufficient rule of 
law, and on other “values for which no strong partisan contends, 
but which, nonetheless, are essential to a good society.”9  There is 
under such circumstances a sense on the part of many that their 
contributing to the maintenance of the rule of law may demand 
too much self-restraint in promoting their own sense of justice or 
sound public policy.10  Such self-restraint, if it is not promptly, 
clearly, and equally matched by one’s political and legal 
opponents, often seems to involve one’s disadvantaging and 
exploitation by those opponents.11 
 
5 See Wright, Magna Carta, supra note 4, at 256–60. 
6 Id. 
7 Even, presumably, if those substantive legal goals are of course ultimately 
dependent upon some sufficient rule of law. 
8 See Wright, Magna Carta, supra note 4, at 260 n.114. The basic logic of what 
is, in our culture, an apparently increasingly severe collective Prisoner’s Dilemma is 
classically set forth in ANATOL RAPOPORT & ALBERT M. CHAMMAH, PRISONER’S 
DILEMMA: A STUDY IN CONFLICT AND COOPERATION 111 (1970). 
9 Edward Shils, Ideology and Civility, in THE VIRTUE OF CIVILITY: SELECTED 
ESSAYS ON LIBERALISM, TRADITION, AND CIVIL SOCIETY 25, 50 (Steven Grosby ed., 
1997). Thus, the problem is not resolved merely by the continued existence of some 
groups that give higher priority to the rule of law and other increasingly jeopardized 
but essential public goods. 
10 See Wright, Magna Carta, supra note 4, at 265. 
11 Thus, once more, the increasingly severe Prisoner’s Dilemma problem. See id. 
at 260 n.114. 
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One possible perspective on this particular decision-making 
pathology might be termed “moralistic.”12  Some groups may, on 
this perspective, follow their own policy agenda, but with an 
element of what an observer might moralistically call self-
indulgence.13  This individual and group self-indulgence validates 
the broader observation that “[o]ther things being equal, people 
in most cultures believe they are superior to most others in their 
group.”14 
In terms we elaborate below, this form of self-indulgence 
involves a refusal to acknowledge, as one’s epistemic peers, 
persons and groups one genuinely ought to so acknowledge.15  
Our sense of who counts as our epistemic peer in various legal 
contexts commonly tends to be narrow, and insufficiently 
inclusive.  In virtue terms, we would be better off with 
reasonable “intellectual humility.”16  Epistemic humility would 
involve “a disposition not to make unwarranted intellectual 
entitlement claims on the basis of one’s (supposed) superiority or 
excellence. . . .”17 
The effects of out-group epistemic disdain in legal contexts 
need not, however, be thought of in narrowly moralistic or 
virtuistic terms.  Consider the basic problem of insufficient  
 
 
12 See Wright, The Rule of Law, supra note 4, at 1126. 
13 See generally HEATHER BATTALY, VIRTUE 97 (2015) (crucially distinguishing 
epistemic self-indulgence from moral self-indulgence, at least in certain respects). 
For further detail on the concept of epistemic self-indulgence, see Heather Battaly, 
Epistemic Self-Indulgence, in VIRTUE AND VICE, MORAL AND EPISTEMIC 214, 214 
(Heather Battaly, ed. 2010). More broadly, see Heather Horn, Self-Indulgence: 
Defining Quality of Our Time?, ATLANTIC (June 21, 2010), https://www.theatlantic. 
com/national/archive/2010/06/self-indulgence-defining-quality-of-our-time/340666. 
14 RICHARD E. NISBETT, MINDWARE: TOOLS FOR SMART THINKING 198 (2015). 
For evidence of related cultural shifts over time, see JEAN M. TWENGE & W. KEITH 
CAMPBELL, THE NARCISSISM EPIDEMIC: LIVING IN THE AGE OF ENTITLEMENT 13 
(2009). 
15 See infra Part I. 
16 ROBERT C. ROBERTS & W. JAY WOOD, INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES: AN ESSAY IN 
REGULATIVE EPISTEMOLOGY 250 (2009). 
17 Id. Consider also the instances of mutual epistemic respect, and of what we 
refer to as acknowledged broad epistemic peerhood, among a number of Supreme 
Court Justices of opposing ideological beliefs, including, reputedly, the relationship 
between Justices Antonin Scalia and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. See, e.g., Daniel Politi, 
Read Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Touching Statement on Scalia, SLATE (Feb. 14, 
2016, 4:04 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2016/02/14/read_justice_ruth 
_bader_ginsburg_s_touching_statement_on_scalia.html. 
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acknowledgement of epistemic peerhood18 in light of the more 
pragmatic approach of Thomas Hobbes.19  Hobbes classically 
holds that: 
Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of . . . mind; as 
that though there be found one man sometimes 
manifestly . . . of quicker mind than another; yet when all is 
reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not 
so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself 
any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he.20 
To those who doubt such claims of overall mental equality, 
Hobbes snarkily responds: 
That which may perhaps make such equality incredible, is but a 
vain conceit of one’s own wisdome, which almost all men think 
they have in a greater degree than the vulgar; that is, than all 
men but themselves, and a few others, whom by fame, or for 
concurring with themselves, they approve.21 
Whether everyone concurs with Hobbes in this regard is not 
ultimately crucial.  Something roughly like Hobbes’s approach 
may, at a minimum, be required for the sustained viability of a 
legal system.  Most groups, after all, can generally recognize, 
with some accuracy, whether they are being broadly 
epistemically disdained by others or not.22  Permanent 
acceptance of broad epistemic disdain of one’s group by others is 
not to be generally expected.  Broad epistemic disdain between 
and among substantial groups in a largely knowledge-based 
society, or in a broadly representative democracy, does not 
promote any reasonably stable legal or social equilibrium.23 
More positively, there is certainly much to be said for what 
we will call a broad and inclusive acknowledgement of epistemic 
peerhood throughout our legal system.  To begin with, consider 
some of the biases and pathologies affecting public discussion 
and decision making that adversely affect the credentialed, the 
formally elite, the celebrated, and the powerful, and assuredly 
not merely those of lower status.  The work of Professor Philip 
Tetlock, for example, establishes the tendency of high-status, 
 
18 See infra Part I. 
19 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 82–83 (J.C.A. Gaskin ed., Oxford Univ. 
Press 1996) (1651). 
20 Id. at 82. 
21 Id. 
22 See generally NISBETT, supra note 14. 
23 Id. 
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credentialed experts to overesteem their own judgments and 
predictions, in various important respects.24  In particular, elites 
can be susceptible to various decision-making pathologies, 
including one form or another of “groupthink,”25 confirmation 
bias,26 and motivated reasoning,27 as well as the full range of 
classic subconscious defense mechanisms, including denial,28 
 
24 See, e.g., PHILIP E. TETLOCK, EXPERT POLITICAL JUDGMENT: HOW GOOD IS IT? 
HOW CAN WE KNOW? 231–33 (2005); PHILIP E. TETLOCK & DAN GARDNER, 
SUPERFORECASTING: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF PREDICTION (2015). Note also the 
tendency of some public intellectuals to produce what Judge Richard Posner has 
called “solidarity” goods along with “credence” goods. TETLOCK, EXPERT POLITICAL 
JUDGMENT: HOW GOOD IS IT? HOW CAN WE KNOW?, supra, at 232. For a more public 
institutionally-focused perspective, see PETER H. SCHUCK, WHY GOVERNMENT FAILS 
SO OFTEN: AND HOW IT CAN DO BETTER 158 (2014). 
25 See, e.g., IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY 
DECISIONS AND FIASCOES 7 (2d ed. 2013); Robert S. Baron, So Right It’s Wrong: 
Groupthink and the Ubiquitous Nature of Polarized Group Decision Making, 37 
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 219, 219 (2005); What Is Groupthink?, 
PSYCHOL. FOR SOC. RESP., http://www.psysr.org/about/pubs_resources/groupthink 
%20overview.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2018) (noting in particular that the 
groupthink symptoms of “[s]tereotyped views of out-groups—Negative views of 
‘enemy’ make effective responses seem unnecessary”). More constructively, see 
generally Jane C. Hu, Group Smarts, AEON (Oct. 3, 2016), https://aeon.co/essays/how 
-collective-intelligence-overcomes-the-problem-of-groupthink. We need not rely 
herein on any relatively narrow or technical meaning of the term “groupthink.” See 
DAVID HARDMAN, JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: PSYCHOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 150 (2009) (“Given the relative paucity of strong evidence for 
groupthink, it is perhaps ironic that it has come to occupy such a prominent cultural 
position,” which might itself thus be considered an example of groupthink). 
26 See, Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in 
Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175 (1998); Ray Nickerson, Confirmation 
Bias: A Psychological Phenomenon That Helps Explain Why Pundits Got It Wrong, 
CONVERSATION (Nov. 21, 2016, 10:14 PM), https://theconversation.com/confirmation-
bias-a-psychological-phenomenon-that-helps-explain-why-pundits-got-it-wrong-
68781 (emphasizing the adverse role of experts’ selectivity of attention); GILOVICH & 
ROSS, supra note 3, at 144. 
27 See Dan Kahan, What Is Motivated Reasoning and How Does It Work?, SCI. & 
RELIGION TODAY (May 4, 2011), www.scienceandreligiontoday.com/2011/05/04/what-
is-motivated-reasoning (citing personal needs, ends, and goals as biasing the search 
for, evaluation, and other processing of potentially available information, in such a 
way as to steer judgments toward identity protection as distinct from genuine 
insight, learning, or truth and raising the ironic and further socially damaging 
possibility that we may tend to detect motivated reasoning “only in those who 
disagree with us”); Dan M. Kahan, Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive 
Reflection, 8 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 407, 407–08 (2013) (focusing in 
particular on ideologically motivated reasoning); David P.. Redlawsk et al., The 
Affective Tipping Point: Do Motivated Reasoners Ever “Get It”?, 31 POL. PSYCHOL. 
563, 563 (2010). 
28 For a useful discussion, see ANNA FREUD, 2 THE WRITINGS OF ANNA FREUD: 
THE EGO AND MECHANISMS OF DEFENSE 32 (rev. ed. 1966) (1936); GEORGE E. 
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psychological repression,29 regression to less fully mature 
development stages,30 displacement and redirection of emotion 
and affect,31 projection,32 identification,33 reaction formation,34 
and rationalization.35  And it may, importantly, be far easier to 
detect such decision-making pathologies in others than in 
ourselves and our allies. 
Among the effects of these pathologies is a tendency to deny 
epistemic peerhood to individuals or groups where it would be 
actually appropriate and broadly beneficial in the long term to do 
so.  A part of a remedy was classically suggested by John Stuart 
Mill.  Mill argued that a genuine understanding of one’s own 
controversial positions requires more than just an abstract 
encounter with opposing views.36  For a genuine understanding of 
even one’s own views, one must confront counterarguments as 
they are articulated not merely hypothetically, by designated 
foils, or by devil’s advocates, but by persons—whether elite or 
nonelite—who actually hold the beliefs in question.37 
There is a possible argument for erring on the side of 
overinclusiveness in acknowledging one’s epistemic peers that is 
grounded partly in sheer politeness, social civility, amiability, 
and ambient pleasantness, even at elite levels.38  But there are, 
 
VAILLANT, EGO MECHANISMS OF DEFENSE: A GUIDE FOR CLINICIANS AND 
RESEARCHERS 7 (1992); PHEBE CRAMER, PROTECTING THE SELF: DEFENSE 
MECHANISMS IN ACTION 4 (2006). 
29 See FREUD, supra note 28, at 51. 
30 See id. at 50. 
31 See id. at 32. 
32 See CRAMER, supra note 28, at 92 (“[W]e can see extensive use of projection as 
a means of ensuring group cohesiveness through the formation of adolescent cliques 
and in the functioning of ‘in groups’ and ‘out groups.’ ”). 
33 See FREUD, supra note 28, at 43. 
34 See id. at 44. 
35 See id. at 21. 
36 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 41 (John Gray ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 
1991) (1859). 
37 See id. at 42–43. Remarkably, it is reported that the followers of the 
eventually widely discredited Soviet agricultural theorist Trofim Lysenko “had never 
studied the scientific arguments of their opponents.” VALERY N. SOYFER, LYSENKO 
AND THE TRAGEDY OF SOVIET SCIENCE 302 (Leo Gruliow & Rebecca Gruliow trans., 
1994). 
38 For specific guidelines for more or less formal academic discussions, see, e.g., 
NYU Guidelines for Respectful Philosophical Discussion, NYU ARTS & SCI., 
https://as.nyu.edu/content/nyu-as/as/departments/philosophy/climate/initiatives/nyu-
guidelines-for-respectful-philosophical-discussion.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2018); 
David Chalmers, Guidelines for Respectful, Constructive, and Inclusive Philosophical 
Discussion, CONSC.NET, http://consc.net/norms.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2018); 
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crucially, also more substantive grounds for relatively expansive 
and inclusive understandings of who should count as one’s 
epistemic peer.  Better policy discussions; better decision-making 
processes; higher motivation to engage in occasionally painful 
learning; and better, or more justified, decision-making outcomes 
can result from a broadened acknowledgement of epistemic peer 
status in others.  Generosity and breadth in recognizing and 
acknowledging one’s epistemic peers can pay off for all. 
For example, the important “constructive controversy” 
approach to group learning emphasizes confirming the value and 
competence of each group discussion participant,39 among other 
considerations.  Restricting decision-making group membership 
to those who are considered high-status individuals or to one’s 
narrowly defined epistemic peers can impair the overall 
performance level of the group in question.40  In general, group 
homogeneity can impair the quality of group discussion and 
decision making.  This is partly due to the tendency of groups to 
dwell upon and overemphasize information and beliefs that are 
already shared, and perhaps known to be shared, by the group 
members prior to deliberation.41 
Remarkably, decision-making outcomes in legal and other 
contexts can often be enhanced by emphasizing the inclusion of 
persons and groups with a range of backgrounds and conflicting 
 
Sean Carroll, Norms For Respectful Classroom/Seminar Discussion, PREPOSTEROUS 
UNIVERSE (Sept. 9, 2014), www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/09/09/norms. 
However, many norms of politeness can be observed even under very narrow 
understandings of who qualifies as one’s epistemic peer. 
39 See, e.g., David W. Johnson & Roger T. Johnson, Energizing Learning: The 
Instructional Power of Conflict, 38 EDUC. RESEARCHER 37, 42–43 (2009). It seems 
fair to assume that a norm of avoiding unjustified or imprudent denials of epistemic 
peerhood status is related to, but distinct from, most dimensions of political civility. 
See generally Robin Stryker et al., What Is Political Incivility?, 83 COMM. 
MONOGRAPHS 535 (2016). For examples of incivility, see id. at 8 tbl.1 (listing various 
forms of incivility, including “[r]efusing to let those with whom one disagrees take 
part in a political discussion”). 
40 Such cases could encompass instances in which some potential group 
members are excluded on grounds of their allegedly falling short of relevant 
epistemic peerhood. For general background, see Boris Groysberg et al., Too Many 
Cooks Spoil the Broth: How High-Status Individuals Decrease Group Effectiveness, 
22 ORG. SCI. 722, 722 (2011); Roderick I. Swaab et al., The Too-Much-Talent Effect: 
Team Interdependence Determines When More Talent Is Too Much or Not Enough, 25 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 1581, 1587 (2014). 
41 See HARDMAN, supra note 25, at 148 (“[D]iscussion tends to focus on 
information that was already known and shared by the group prior to any 
interaction.”) (internal citation omitted); GILOVICH & ROSS, supra note 3, at 156. 
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and unshared experiences.  We often reach better results not 
from the wisdom of narrow elites, but from the proverbial 
“wisdom of crowds.”42 
But this is just the beginning.  Openness and inclusion, and 
most especially, valuing various forms of independence, 
contrarianism, dissent, and disparity in constituting a decision-
making group are often crucial.  James Surowiecki minimally 
concludes that, “in general, it’s smarter to cast as wide a net as 
possible, rather than wasting time figuring out who should be in 
the group and who should not.”43  But we can often improve on 
the already helpful basic “wisdom of crowds” principle.  
Independent-minded, contrarian, and self-identified dissenters in 
particular can often make distinctly valuable further 
contributions to the quality of legal and other forms of group 
decision making. 
None of this is to deny the importance of general, across-the-
board upgrades in epistemic capabilities and education in 
general.44  If we were all more broadly and deeply educated, in 
 
42 See JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS 31 (2005) (“[I]f you can 
assemble a diverse group of people who possess varying degrees of knowledge and 
insight, you’re better off entrusting it with major decisions rather than leaving them 
in the hands of one or two people, no matter how smart those people are.”). 
43 Id. at 276. The “wisdom of crowds” process tends to work only to the degree 
that the decision-making group members contribute independently from differing 
and uncorrelated backgrounds. See id. at 10; DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST 
AND SLOW 84 (2011); see also Philip Ball, ‘Wisdom of the Crowd’: The Myths and 
Realities, BBC: FUTURE (July 8, 2014), www.bbc.com/future/story/20140708-when-
crowd-wisdom-goes-wrong (“[I]t’s better still to add individuals who aren’t simply 
independent thinkers but whose views are ‘negatively correlated’—as different as 
possible—from the existing members. In order words, diversity trumps 
independence.”); Clintin P. Davis-Stober et al., When Is a Crowd Wise?, 1 DECISION 
79, 98 (2014) (endorsing a greater emphasis on the value of substantive differences 
in judgments than on the independence of those judgments); Dražen Prelec et al., A 
Solution to the Single-Question Crowd Wisdom Problem, 541 NATURE, Jan 2017, at 
532, 532 (emphasizing further the special value of judgments that the holder 
believes to be distinctly minority judgments). 
44 For background, see, e.g., CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE REVOLT OF THE ELITES 
AND THE BETRAYAL OF DEMOCRACY 161–175 (1995); PIACC 2012/2014 Results, 
NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, https://nces.ed.gov/surveys/piaac/results/sum 
mary.aspx (last visited Feb. 15, 2018) (providing statistics on U.S. and international 
adult competency levels in literacy and numeracy); David Kastberg et al., NAT’L CTR. 
FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., PERFORMANCE OF U.S. 15-YEAR-OLD 
STUDENTS IN SCIENCE, READING, AND MATHEMATICS LITERACY IN AN 
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT, https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2017/2017048.pdf (2016); 2015 
Mathematics & Reading Assessments, NATION’S REPORT CARD, www.nations 
reportcard.gov/reading_math_2015 (last visited Feb. 15, 2018) (providing large 
samples of U.S. fourth grade and eighth grade students). 
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meaningful ways, the quality of public discussion and decision 
making would doubtless tend to improve.  A broadened and more 
inclusive acknowledgement of who counts as one’s epistemic peer, 
as recommended here, does not by itself guarantee that the more 
inclusive epistemic peerhood exists at a distinctively high level of 
deliberative competence.  The quality, breadth, depth, and 
intensity of education, broadly understood, matters as well.  
However, these separate concerns, for both broader epistemic 
peerhood, as emphasized in this Article, and for stronger 
education certainly need not conflict with one another.  Either 
can inspire the other. 
We thus have, at this point, a preliminary sense of the 
importance of some possible choices in deciding whose voices and 
participation should be taken seriously, as that of our epistemic 
peers, in deciding legal questions.  This Article addresses these 
preliminary understandings in several legal contexts.45  We can 
do so most profitably on the basis of a better, fuller, and more 
specific understanding of the crucial idea of epistemic peerhood.  
It is thus the idea of epistemic peerhood itself that this Article 
addresses immediately below. 
I. AN UNDERSTANDING OF EPISTEMIC PEERHOOD SUITABLE FOR 
LEGAL CONTEXTS 
Deliberation in the law and elsewhere involves a distinctive 
kind of thinking style.  Deliberation has been described as “quiet, 
reflective, open to a wide range of evidence, [and] respectful of 
different views.”46  There is thus a deliberative method, involving 
“a rational process of weighing the available data, considering 
alternative possibilities, arguing about relevance and worthiness, 
and then choosing the best policy or person.”47 
But deliberation is not simply a way of thinking.  There is 
also the crucial dimension of membership and status in the 
deliberating group.  Openness to evidence and respect for 
differing views, along with a desire for the best deliberative  
 
 
45 See infra Parts II–V. 
46 Michael Walzer, Deliberation, and What Else?, in DELIBERATIVE POLITICS: 
ESSAYS ON DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 58, 58 (Stephen Macedo ed., 1999). 
47 Id. 
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outcome,48 may ultimately be inseparable from appropriate 
openness to possible contributors, and appropriate respect for 
those persons as fellow deliberators.49 
Legal deliberation thus involves questions not only of 
method, but of membership, or more precisely of who counts as a 
full and respected member of the deliberative community.  The 
idea of epistemic peerhood is therefore central to any conception 
of legal deliberation.50  The idea of epistemic peerhood, actual or 
perceived, takes a number of different forms.51  The specialists 
themselves take different approaches.  “Peerhood” may itself be 
variously defined in terms of either sameness,52 equality,53 rough 
 
48 See id. 
49 John Stuart Mill argued, in effect, that the best understanding of particular 
arguments and viewpoints may require the active participation of persons actually 
holding those views. See supra notes 36–37. In the pure literary realm, consider the 
widespread initial doubts as to Sancho Panza’s epistemic peerhood in MIGUEL DE 
CERVANTES, DON QUIJOTE 593–98 (Diana De Armas Wilson ed., Burton Raffel 
trans., 1999) (1615). The acknowledged epistemic peerhood among distinct groups 
has expanded. See GOTTHOLD LESSING, NATHAN THE WISE, act 3, sc. “An Audience 
Room in the Sultan’s Palace”; act 3, sc. “The Place of Palms, close to Nathan’s 
House” (chronicling the story of a group of Muslims, Christians and Jews as they 
overcome initial prejudices, find a common bond, and unite as one unit despite their 
diverse religious backgrounds). 
50 For the moment, we set aside questions involving the status of persons who 
are, are recognized as, or are at least thought to be, our epistemic superiors or our 
epistemic inferiors. 
51 See, e.g., JONATHAN MATHESON, DISAGREEMENT AND EPISTEMIC PEERS, 
OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE 3 (2015), http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10. 
1093/oxfordhb/9780199935314.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199935314-e-13?print=pdf. 
52 See, e.g., Stewart Cohen, A Defense of the (Almost) Equal Weight View, in THE 
EPISTEMOLOGY OF DISAGREEMENT: NEW ESSAYS 98, 98 (David Christensen & 
Jennifer Lackey eds., 2013) (“When parties to a disagreement have the same 
evidence and are equal in their reasoning abilities, they are epistemic peers.”); 
Stefan Reining, Peerhood in Deep Religious Disagreements, 52 RELIGIOUS STUD. 403, 
403 (2016) (referring to one person’s having “the same or equally good evidence” as 
another person, and to being “equally competent . . . in making judgements on the 
basis of the kind of evidence in question”); see also Nathan L. King, Disagreement: 
What’s the Problem? or A Good Peer Is Hard To Find, 85 PHIL. & 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 249, 252 (2012) (epistemic peer status requires having 
“the same relevant evidence”); Michael P. Lynch et al., Intellectual Humility in 
Public Discourse, UCONN HUMANITIES INST. § 2.2 (2012), http://humilityand 
conviction.uconn.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/1877/2016/09/IHPD-Literature-Rev 
iew-revised.pdf (referring briefly to “possessing the same evidence” as a 
characteristic of a peer disagreement). 
53 See, e.g., MATHESON, supra note 51, at 2 (“[E]pistemic peers are a kind of 
epistemic equal. . . . [involving] equality in evidential possession and equality in 
evidential processing.”); see also Graham Oppy, Disagreement, 68 INT’L J. FOR PHIL. 
& RELIGION 183, 187 (2010) (describing cognitive peers as “cognitive equals,” and 
evidential peers as “evidential equals,” in the sense of being “equally well informed” 
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equality,54 or even incomparability or incommensurability55 
between persons, or between groups.  In any version of epistemic 
peerhood, the focus is on both the possession of, and the broad 
ability to process, arguably relevant evidence.  The term 
“epistemic,” as in the idea of epistemic peerhood, is here again 
merely shorthand for the various elements involved in somehow 
obtaining, processing, and assessing the evidence at issue in a 
given controversy.56  Issues of epistemic peerhood, or the absence 
thereof, can arise in any group decision-making context.  Our 
focus below is of course on various contexts of legal discussion 
and decision making.  The key point to bear in mind is that in 
such contexts, we are generally better off, overall, with both a 
theory and a practice of broad, expansive, and inclusive epistemic 
peerhood. 
 
in that area); Benjamin Wald, Dealing with Disagreement: Distinguishing Two Types 
of Epistemic Peers, 3 SPONTANEOUS GENERATIONS: J. FOR HIST. & PHIL. SCI. 113, 
113 (2009) (describing epistemic peers as “equally well informed and intelligent” 
investigators); Richard Rowland, The Epistemology of Moral Disagreement, 12 PHIL. 
COMPASS 1 (2017) (distinguishing between equality of epistemic virtues and equality 
in one’s chances of correctness on the question at issue). 
54 See, e.g., BRYAN FRANCES, DISAGREEMENT 43 (2014) (arguing that if persons 
“are roughly equal on all Disagreement Factors, then they are epistemic peers” on 
the question at issue) (emphasis omitted). Frances elsewhere lists the 
“Disagreement Factors” as involving data, evidence, time, ability, background 
knowledge, and the circumstances of investigation. Id. at 26; see also Juan 
Comesana, Conciliation and Peer-Demotion in the Epistemology of Disagreement, 49 
AM. PHIL. Q. 237, 238 (2012) (“Some philosophers have thought that two subjects are 
epistemic peers just in case, roughly, they are approximately equal when it comes to 
general epistemic virtues such as intelligence, thoughtfulness, [and] freedom from 
bias . . . .”). Somewhat more broadly, see David Killoren, Moral Intuitions, 
Reliability and Disagreement, 4 J. ETHICS & SOC. PHIL. 15, 17 (2010) (referring to 
differing mixes of epistemic virtues and vices of one person as “just as good” as those 
of another person). 
55 See Lynch et al., supra note 52, § 2.1, at 10 (referring to “epistemic 
incommensurability”). In this context, however, the incommensurability or 
noncomparability in question is taken to involve, unfortunately, “a threat to 
meaningful public discourse.” Id. Thus, “[i]f we can’t agree on whose methods of 
inquiry are correct, then it is hard to see how we could agree whose view of the facts 
is correct.” Id. In contrast, we should consider more benign, and indeed positive, 
implications of epistemic incommensurability. Difficulties in fully and accurately 
communicating our disparate experiences means we should hesitate to downgrade, 
let alone dismiss, the value of incomparable lived experiences of other persons and 
groups. 
56 The term “epistemic” in this area thus refers not so much to knowledge, but 
more broadly to matters of evidence, reflection, productive discussion, belief, and 
judgment. See supra note 1. 
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To begin the analysis, persons or groups can, for our 
purposes, clearly be epistemically equal, in the law and 
elsewhere, without being epistemically the same.57  Equality in 
general need not involve sameness.  There are plainly several 
dimensions to acquiring, processing, and judging experiences and 
evidence.  Weaknesses, relative to another person or group, in 
any one such dimension may be offset by relative strengths in 
some other dimension,58 resulting in net relevant epistemic 
equality without sameness.59 
But in any typical case of epistemic peerhood, meaningful 
judgments of precise epistemic equality will normally be 
unavailable.  Ordinarily, judgments that persons have either 
precisely the same or equal evidence, or that they process 
evidence precisely equally well, are unavoidably arbitrary, 
contestable, and entirely unnecessary.60  All one needs on this 
approach is an idea of rough pragmatic equality, or of 
approximate epistemic equality.61 
In fact, even the idea of rough or approximate epistemic 
equality is itself a bit misleading, however convenient and 
typically harmless the idea may be.  We might instead more 
properly think in terms of what we could call epistemic 
incommensurability.  Sometimes, two items cannot be put on any 
common measuring scale.  Epistemic incommensurability, or 
incomparability, is clearly not the same thing as epistemic 
equality, precise or otherwise.62  As we note below in the context 
of campus affirmative action, there may be cases in which the 
relevant background experiences of persons and groups cannot be 
put, nonarbitrarily, on any common scale, and thereby objectively 
 
57 See, e.g., MATHESON, supra note 51, at 3. 
58 See id. 
59 See id. By analogy, two branches of government might have, overall, equal 
power, without having the same power in any particular respect. More familiarly, a 
baseball pitcher and a baseball position player may be of equal overall value even if 
one is clearly better than the other with respect to, say, batting. 
60 This seems realistically true even in the extreme case of the evidence 
presented to presumed epistemic peer jurors in a criminal or civil trial. See infra 
Part II. 
61 For the bare pragmatic argument outline, see HOBBES, supra notes 19–21 and 
accompanying text. More broadly, one can be a genuine and committed egalitarian 
without hopelessly chasing some unattainable concept of precise equality. See R. 
George Wright, Equal Protection and the Idea of Equality, 34 L. & INEQ. 1, 16 (2016) 
[hereinafter Wright, Equal Protection and the Idea of Equality]. 
62 See R. George Wright, Does Free Speech Jurisprudence Rest on a Mistake?: 
Implications of the Commensurability Debate, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 763, 772 (1990). 
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ranked.63  In such cases of incommensurability of experiences, we 
may well be justified in regarding all such persons and groups as, 
at a much deeper and more fundamental underlying level, 
effectively equals, who bring sensibly-interpreted and valuable 
background experiences to the common discussion.64  We might 
then rightly treat such incomparable persons or groups as 
effective, constructive, or presumptive equals for purposes of 
discussion and problem solving. 
These assumptions jointly suggest a broad, expansive, and 
inclusive view of epistemic peerhood for our purposes.  It is 
admittedly possible, on the contrary, to instead defend a decisive, 
deliberative, and judgment-making role for our presumed 
epistemic superiors, or for presumed epistemic elites.65  But as we 
have seen, and as we further explore in context below,66 broad, 
expansive, inclusive theories and practices of epistemic peerhood 
clearly have much, practically and morally, to recommend them. 
Some philospohers, contrary to our recommended view, 
endorse the idea that epistemic peerhood should be treated as a 
rare phenomenon.  Such a view actually has little to recommend 
it in the context of legal discussion and legal decision making.67  
We might be tempted to think of epistemic peerhood as rare, and 
 
63 See infra Part IV. 
64 See Wright, Equal Protection and the Idea of Equality, supra note 61, at 45–
53 (listing representative theories or defenses, on various grounds, of the 
fundamental equality of persons). 
65 See, e.g., Daniel A. Bell, Democratic Deliberation: The Problem of 
Implementation, in DELIBERATIVE POLITICS, supra note 46, at 70, 74 (“[D]eliberation 
is more likely to be effective if the political culture values decision-making by 
intellectual elites . . . [b]ecause talented elites with the motivation and the ability to 
understand and apply moral principles to complex political controversies . . . are 
more likely to engage in constructive deliberations.”); Russell Hardin, Deliberation: 
Method, Not Theory, in DELIBERATIVE POLITICS, supra note 46, at 103, 112 (noting 
at least on some conceptions, “[i]t is hard to avoid the suspicion that deliberative 
democracy is the ‘democracy’ of elite intellectuals”). For contrasting statements of 
what we might call epistemic egalitarianism drawn from classic literature, see 
DESIDERIUS ERASMUS, THE PRAISE OF FOLLY 127–30 (Clarence H. Miller trans., 2d 
ed. 1979) (1511); see also CHARLES LOUIS DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, THE 
PERSIAN LETTERS 256 (George R. Healy trans., 1964) (1721) (proffering intellect as 
supposedly inversely correlated with attention to details). 
66 See infra Parts II–V. 
67 See, e.g., King, supra note 52, at 250 (“[P]eer disagreement is rare, and . . . we 
rarely have reason to think it obtains in a given case.”); id. at 263 (“When it comes to 
issues we tend to care about, it is rare for subjects to find themselves involved in a 
genuine disagreement with someone who is, and who they have good reason to 
believe is, their epistemic peer.”); see also MATHESON, supra note 51, at 15. 
FINAL_WRIGHT 3/25/2018  6:18 PM 
2017] EPISTEMIC PEERHOOD IN THE LAW 677 
thus as merely a marginal phenomenon, if, among other 
considerations, we believed that given a common body of 
evidence, disputed legal and policy questions typically have some 
single, uniquely right, yet difficult to determine answer.68  In 
such cases, we might think of those persons most frequently 
endorsing the apparently uniquely right answer as somehow 
epistemically superior to the rest of us. 
But in most sustained legal and other public controversies, it 
can hardly be presumed that any such uniquely right and 
evidently ascertainable single answer is available.69  Even if we 
dubiously assume, for example, that the jurors in a given case 
are all exposed to precisely the same evidence, their reasonable 
responses to that evidence, and to the relevant legal instructions, 
will quite defensibly vary.  This will reflect differences in their 
group and individual background experiences, and in their 
varying but defensible priorities in addressing the complexities 
and unavoidable vagueness of the relevant law.70 
We should also appreciate that some entirely legitimate 
perspectives may be inherently more difficult to clearly publicly 
articulate than other, no more valid, perspectives.71  Persons may 
still qualify as epistemic peers, given their available evidence 
and their various evidence-processing skills, even if they are not 
for this reason equally successful in their ability to clearly 
articulate their particular perspective to the far broader public.72  
 
68 See Matthew Kopec & Michael G. Titelbaum, The Uniqueness Thesis, 11 PHIL. 
COMPASS 189, 189 (2016) (“Uniqueness holds, very roughly speaking, that there is a 
unique rational response to a given body of evidence.”). 
69 Professor Ronald Dworkin is often interpreted to argue that there will 
typically exist right answers to most legal disputes. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, 
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81 (1977) (“[R]easonable lawyers and judges will often 
disagree about legal rights, just as citizens and statesmen disagree about political 
rights.”). But see A.D. Woozley, No Right Answer, 29 PHIL. Q. 25, 25–29 (1979).  
70 See Christine Swanton, Virtue Ethics and the Problem of Moral Disagreement, 
38 PHIL. TOPICS 157, 157 (2010) (“Taking moral disagreement seriously is to 
appreciate that much disagreement is deep, reasonable, and intractable . . . .”) 
Rather more narrowly, baseball managers of equal skill, given the same data, might 
reasonably change or not change pitchers at a given time, based on entirely 
reasonable differences in their priorities as among various short- and long-term 
goals. At the broadest level, “outside of mathematics it is rare that the data is so 
conclusive that there is just one conclusion we can draw.” Lynch et al., supra note 
52, at 14. 
71 See Lynch et al., supra note 52, at 12–13. 
72 For a sense of the limits of public articulability as an indicator of the 
soundness or wisdom of the perspective at issue, see EDMUND BURKE, Reflections on 
the Revolution in France, in 2 SELECT WORKS OF EDMUND BURKE 232 & 451 n.30, 
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All of the above considerations, in sum, should contribute to a 
sensible reluctance on everyone’s part to deny epistemic peer 
status even to many of those persons or groups whose explicit 
arguments we may find unfamiliar or obscure, and thus 
unpersuasive. 
Once we are more generally open to a broad, expansive, 
inclusive understanding of who should be considered our 
epistemic peer, we should then reassess, in one way or another, 
any relevant substantive views we hold that are challenged by 
persons to whom we have newly accorded peer epistemic status.73  
But even on a presumably discredited and abandoned narrower 
view of who counts as our epistemic peer, we should have been 
taking some minimal account of the views of those we had 
declined to accredit as our epistemic peers.74 
The extent to which we should reassess our substantive law-
related views, in light of the arguments of either new or long-
acknowledged epistemic peers, is currently being debated by 
academic specialists.75  We need not resolve such controversies 
 
233 & 452 n.5 (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1999). See generally MICHAEL POLANYI, 
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: TOWARDS A POST-CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY (1958). In the 
explicit context of epistemic peerhood, see Jaakko Hirvelä, Is It Safe To Disagree?, 
30 RATIO 305, 311 (2017) (“[T]he evidence that we have is often so subtle that we 
cannot cite it or bring it to focus, and thus we are often not able to fully disclose our 
relevant evidence.”) (citation omitted); Lynch, supra note 52, at 13 (“The inability of 
people to be immediately articulate about their judgment does not show that the 
judgment is the outcome of non-rational process, or even that they lack reasons for 
their view.”). These legitimate inarticulability problems could, to different degrees, 
affect both or all sides in a given legal policy debate. 
73 The more general problem, and one possible response, are recognized by the 
philosopher Henry Sidgwick. Sidgwick assumes, contrary to our suggestion above, 
that “if I find any of my judgments . . . in direct conflict with a judgment of some 
other mind, there must be error somewhere.” HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF 
ETHICS 342 (Dover Publications 7th ed. 1996) (1907). Sidgwick then concludes that 
“if I have no more reason to suspect error in the other mind than in my own, 
reflective comparison between the two judgments necessarily reduces me 
temporarily to a state of neutrality.” Id. 
74 See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. 
75 See, e.g., Comesana, supra note 54, at 237 (contrasting “conciliatory” with 
“nonconciliatory” approaches to newly discovered disagreements between epistemic 
peers); Bryan Frances, Discovering Disagreeing Epistemic Peers and Superiors, 20 
INT’L J. PHIL. STUD. 1, 19–20 (2012) (discussing conciliationist approaches); Thomas 
Kelly, Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence, in DISAGREEMENT 111, 127 
(Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield eds., 2010) (“[M]any of us persist in retaining 
views that are explicitly rejected by those over whom we possess no discernible 
epistemic advantage”). Of course, we may be overall epistemic peers with someone 
with an obviously relevant “blind spot,” if we ourselves have an off-setting or 
equalizing blind spot evidently irrelevant to the particular question at issue. See also 
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here.  But in preparation for the specific legal contextual 
discussions of epistemic peerhood below,76 we should briefly 
consider several points. 
First, while new, or newly discovered, instances of 
disagreement on basic legal issues are clearly worthy of our 
attention, we in fact rarely confront entirely unfamiliar basic 
legal positions, and corresponding basic arguments, opposed to 
our own.77  In broad legal policy contexts, we rarely develop fully 
our own preferred positions, and only then, at that point, first 
discover that our main arguments and conclusions are not 
universally shared.  More positively, and despite the comforts of 
confirmation bias, we tend to sculpt our own views of broad legal 
issues in conjunction with our rejection of opposing views.  We 
typically define ourselves partly in terms of what we are not.  
This implies that a phenomenon of great interest to some 
contemporary philosophers—how to properly respond to 
completely new and unexpected opposition to our views—is 
actually of quite limited concern in most important legal policy 
contexts.78 
Second, in the legal contexts discussed below, we should give 
appropriate weight to what we take to be the most damaging 
current excesses and deficiencies in the overall process of 
recognizing or denying epistemic peerhood.79  If we actually 
believe, contrary to our argument herein, that the main relevant 
contemporary problem is one of excessive epistemic 
egalitarianism, we would presumably, all else equal, then 
endorse a relatively narrow understanding of epistemic 
 
Oppy, supra note 53, at 189 (contrasting “conformist or conciliationist” approaches 
with “non-conformist or steadfast” approaches); Philip Pettit, When To Defer to 
Majority Testimony—And When Not, 66 ANALYSIS 179, 185 (2006) (noting occasions 
on which it may be “hazardous to espouse a policy of testimonial deference to a 
majority”); Robert Mark Simpson, Epistemic Peerhood and the Epistemology of 
Disagreement, 164 PHIL. STUD. 561, 576 (2013) (“In fields like politics, religion, 
ethics, and philosophy, most of us are party to disagreements in which we are 
unable to identify . . . decisive advantages that we hold over the people who disagree 
with us.”). There will also be cases in which expanding the class of those we 
acknowledge as epistemic peers tends to reinforce our established substantive views. 
See Sanford C. Goldberg, Can Asserting That ‘P’ Improve the Speaker’s Epistemic 
Position (And Is That a Good Thing?), 95 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 157, 157 (2017). 
76 See infra Parts II–V. 
77 See supra note 75. 
78 For a sense of this philosophical focus on entirely new, or newly discovered, 
disagreements, see supra note 75. 
79 See infra Parts II–V. 
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peerhood.80  If on the other hand, perhaps for the various reasons 
referred to above, we rightly sense that the greater problem is 
instead one of the undue denial of epistemic peerhood to one’s 
legal and political opponents, we might then encourage persons 
to first seek out a broader, less politically selective media 
exposure, and then partly on that basis to adopt a broader and 
more inclusive understanding of epistemic peerhood.81 
Third, and relatedly, our approach to the proper scope of 
epistemic peerhood should similarly consider what we take to be 
the most severe contemporary excesses and insufficiencies in 
what we might call the epistemic vices.82  If we believe, 
implausibly, that our primary contemporary problem in these 
terms is one of excessive mutual deference, undue indulgence of 
our domestic legal and political foes, and excessive open-minded 
reflection on the views of others outside our own favored 
epistemic circle, then our beliefs as to the proper scope of 
epistemic peerhood should be accordingly narrowed.  If in 
contrast, we would generally prefer wide adoption of a broader 
role for the virtue of epistemic humility, a relatively broad, 
inclusive, and encompassing understanding of genuine epistemic 
peerhood should be more congenial.83 
On this basis, then, let us consider the role of acknowledging 
and denying epistemic peerhood, first to fellow jurors in civil and 
criminal trials generally, and then in the more specific context of 
jury cases in which religious authority is arguably invoked, 
before moving to consider other legal contexts. 
 
80 Or, perhaps more distastefully stated, an expansive understanding of one’s 
epistemic superiority and the corresponding epistemic inferiority of others. 
81 Denial of epistemic peer status to one’s perceived opponents could be both a 
cause and an effect of what is referred to as selective exposure to information, with 
any associated confirmation biases. For discussion, see, e.g., Silvia Knobloch-
Westerwick, Selective Exposure and Reinforcement of Attitudes and Partisanship 
Before a Presidential Election, 62 J. COMM. 628, 628 (2012). More broadly, see 
NATALIE JOMINI STROUD, NICHE NEWS: THE POLITICS OF NEWS CHOICE 14–17, 19 
(2011). 
82 See supra notes 13, 16. See generally Michael S. Brady & Duncan Pritchard, 
Moral and Epistemic Virtues, 34 METAPHILOSOPHY 1 (2003); Killoren, supra note 54. 
83 See Lynch et al., supra note 52, at 15 (“There is a deep connection between 
intellectual humility and meaningful public discourse.”). 
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II. EPISTEMIC PEERHOOD IN THE CONTEXT OF JURY 
DELIBERATION AND DECISION MAKING 
In some sense, the idea of “peerhood” has influenced 
adjudicative thinking at least since the Magna Carta of 1215.84  A 
jury of one’s peers might, as a matter of history and logic, involve 
jurors of the same formal legal status or rank as the defendant.85  
This understanding, by itself, would not carry us very far toward 
the idea of genuine epistemic peerhood among jurors.  But the 
Oxford English Dictionary suggests that a “peer” can also be “[a] 
person who equals another in natural gifts, ability, or 
achievements; the equal in any respect of a person or thing.”86  In 
this and similar respects, criminal and civil trial juries can vary 
in the extent to which the jurors are, or regard themselves as, 
epistemic peers.  And the degree of epistemic peerhood, actual 
and acknowledged, among jurors could make a difference to the 
quality of jury deliberation. 
Classically, Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel referred to the 
jury deliberation process as “an interesting combination of 
rational persuasion, sheer social pressure, and the psychological 
mechanism by which individual perceptions undergo change 
when exposed to group discussion.”87  These processes typically 
unfold, however, through one degree or another of a denial on the 
part of some jurors of anything like universal epistemic and other 




84 Clause 39 of the Magna Carta requires that imprisonment take place only 
pursuant to “lawful [peer] judgment” or “the law of the land.” MAGNA CARTA cl. 39. 
The Sixth Amendment refers explicitly not to a jury of one’s peers, but to “an 
impartial jury.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Impartiality itself seems to say little about 
relations among jury members. The idea of community representativeness at least 
begins to address juror relationships for deliberative and decision making purposes. 
For background, see Robert C. Walters et al., Jury of Our Peers: An Unfulfilled 
Constitutional Promise, 58 SMU L. REV. 319, 319–21, 355 (2005). 
85 For some basis for such an approach, see the first definition of “peer” offered 
by the Oxford English Dictionary. Peer, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). 
The Oxford English Dictionary then cites William Blackstone for the principle that 
all “[c]ommoners” are peers in the sense that they all lack the status of nobility. See 
id. at A.1.a. 
86 See id. at A.1.b. By comparison, see the equality-focused understandings of 
epistemic peerhood referred to supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text. 
87 HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 489 (1966). 
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Thus, for example, ratings as to a particular juror’s relative 
influence tend to correlate with the level of formal education of 
the juror in question.88  The more influential jurors tend also to 
be of relatively high socioeconomic status,89 and, even today, to be 
male.90  In particular, those jurors selected for the role of 
foreperson tend to be better educated,91 Caucasian,92 and male.93  
Disproportionate speaking time among jurors during 
deliberations tends also to be associated with education,94 
occupational status,95 and gender.96 
These disparities raise the question of equality of epistemic 
status, or the lack thereof, in the context of jury deliberation and 
judgment.  A part of the problem of anyone’s discounting some 
particular fellow juror’s perspective, and of the denial in that 
respect of full epistemic peer status, is tied to juror reactions to 
what we have called the incomparability or incommensurability 
of relevant personal or group experiences.97 
It is important in this context to note how jurors who hear 
what is nominally the “same” evidence in a given case can 
variously react to such evidence.98  Evidently, jurors filter such 
trial evidence “through their own experiences, expectations, 
values, and beliefs.”99  Such experiences may be unshared, or 
even incommensurable, and only imperfectly articulable, but 
certainly no less relevant, legitimate, and potentially valuable 
under the circumstances.100 
 
88 See DENNIS J. DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING: THE STATE OF THE SCIENCE 
166 (2012). 
89 See id. 
90 See id. 
91 See id. at 155. 
92 See id. 
93 See id. (citing several separate studies). 
94 See id.; Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Some Steps Between Attitudes and Verdicts, in 
INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 42, 59 (Reid 
Hastie ed., 1993). 
95 See DEVINE, supra note 88, at 155. 
96 See id. 
97 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
98 See Brian H. Bornstein & Edie Greene, Jury Decision Making: Implications 
for and from Psychology, 20 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 63, 64 (2011). 
99 Id. at 64–65. 
100 As the normatively focused philosopher John Rawls broadly observes, “To 
some extent . . . the way we assess evidence and weigh moral and political values is 
shaped by our total experience, our whole course of life up to now; and our total 
experiences must always differ.” JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 56–57 (1993). 
FINAL_WRIGHT 3/25/2018  6:18 PM 
2017] EPISTEMIC PEERHOOD IN THE LAW 683 
Inevitably, equally legitimate life experiences, and related 
group demographic considerations,101 affect the legitimate 
inferences, perceptions, and beliefs of jurors.102  No given 
individual juror, in all her distinctive and complex particularity, 
can simply mirror an entire broader community.103  As we have 
seen, typical group decision making, beyond highly technical 
contexts, tends to flourish when a wide range of potential 
contributors are taken as epistemically worthy.104 
In the jury context, it has thus sensibly been concluded that 
“the jury cannot perform its fact-finding, interpretative, or 
educational functions effectively if it fails to consider the views of 
all of its members.”105  Thoroughness in jury deliberations 
requires attention to more, rather than fewer, of the empaneled 
jurors and their distinct perspectives.106  It is hardly surprising 
that thoroughness in such deliberations tends to produce what 
are judged to be “legally appropriate” decisions.107 
This is not to suggest that the actual course and content of 
jury deliberations are entirely a matter of responding to what 
other jurors have said, or of filling in perceived conversational 
gaps.108  Just knowing that one is serving on a racially diverse 
 
101 See Nancy S. Marder, Juries, Justice & Multiculturalism, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 
659, 663 (2002). 
102 Id. at 666. 
103 See Jeffrey Abramson, Two Ideals of Jury Deliberation, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 125, 125–26, 129 (noting the distinction between individual juror impartiality and 
something like an overall, collective jury impartiality obtained through cross-
sectional community representation on juries). 
104 See generally supra Part I, and perhaps most famously, the “wisdom of 
crowds” studies referred to in supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text. One 
modest limitation, in the jury context, is that pressuring reluctant jurors to speak 
may be counterproductive to the degree that reluctant jurors express inaccurate 
accounts of the evidence, where those false memories might go uncorrected by other 
jurors. See Jessica M. Salerno & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Promise of a 
Cognitive Perspective on Jury Deliberation, 17 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 174, 177 
(2010). 
105 Nancy S. Marder, Note, Gender Dynamics and Jury Deliberations, 96 YALE 
L.J. 593, 593 (1987). 
106 DEVINE, supra note 88, at 165. 
107 See id. 
108 In particular, the racial composition of a jury can apparently influence juror 
perceptions of a case even before actual jury deliberations have begun. See Samuel 
R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know About Race and 
Juries? A Review of Social Science Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997, 
1030 (2003); see also Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision 
Making: Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 597, 597–98 (2006) (noting both direct discussion-
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jury, by itself, can apparently have some effects on juror beliefs.  
But these sorts of effects are partly separate from, for example, 
the tendency toward greater deliberative thoroughness of racially 
diverse juries.109 
What we have called a willingness to acknowledge relevant 
epistemic peerhood on a broad, inclusive, expansive basis is thus 
at the heart of what a number of scholars recommend as the path 
to improved jury deliberations and outcomes.  Among other 
sensible recommendations, jury deliberations should, crucially, 
be inclusive and comprehensive.110  Such deliberations should 
involve the “active participation of most (if not all) members”111 of 
the jury.  And jury members collectively should “foster an 
environment where . . . belief change is a function of 
informational influence as opposed to peer pressure or 
factionalism.”112 
Below, we briefly consider a more specific context in which a 
fundamental threat to broad and meaningful epistemic peerhood 
puts the quality of jury deliberations and outcomes at risk. 
III. EPISTEMIC PEERHOOD AMONG JURORS AND THE PROBLEM OF 
APPEAL TO DISTINCTIVELY RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY 
Inevitably, jurors bring their deepest convictions on moral 
and other matters to jury deliberations.  For some jurors, these 
convictions will in part be religious in nature.  Nor are jurors 
always inclined to, or even capable of, translating their religious 
and other metaphysical beliefs into terms that count as 
sufficiently nonmetaphysical, or that are shared by all other 
jurors.113 
 
related effects and other effects of racial diversity on the quality of jury decision 
making). 
109 See supra note 108. 
110 See Dennis J. Devine et al., Deliberation Quality: A Preliminary Examination 
in Criminal Juries, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 273, 276 (2007). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 For background, see RAWLS, supra note 100, at 212–54 (defining the scope 
and limits of public reason). To some extent, extreme cases can be addressed 
through jury instructions, voir dire, and the use of peremptory and for cause 
challenges to prospective jurors. For a useful response to Rawls on religion and 
public reason, see LENN E. GOODMAN, RELIGIOUS PLURALISM AND VALUES IN THE 
PUBLIC SPHERE 54–84 (2014); see also CHRISTOPHER J. EBERLE, RELIGIOUS 
CONVICTIONS IN LIBERAL POLITICS 141–50 (2002); ROBERT AUDI, RELIGIOUS 
COMMITMENT AND SECULAR REASON 90 (2000); Jeremy Waldron, Isolating Public 
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The sheer impossibility of effectively requiring jurors to 
check their deepest convictions at the jury room door means that 
some distinction between appropriate and inappropriate recourse 
to religious beliefs by jurors should be drawn.  Finding all juror 
speech that is somehow informed, at some level, by religious 
beliefs to be legally inappropriate is plainly unrealistic.  But this 
leaves open a number questions such as the propriety of a juror’s 
quoting, accurately or not, from religious texts, or paraphrases 
thereof. 
If it is unrealistic to distinguish among all such knowing or 
perhaps unknowing oral references by jurors, a legal line might 
then be drawn at, say, the mere physical presence of a Bible or 
comparable religious text, at least in printed form,114 in the jury 
room.115  Or the courts might seek to draw the line of legal 
permissibility between the mere presence of a Bible, and the 
actual use of a Bible.116 
As it turns out, though, there is some evidence that the mere 
physical presence of a Bible in the jury room may not itself be 
without some influence.117  But for our purposes herein, we can 
 
Reasons, in RAWLS’S POLITICAL LIBERALISM 113, 124–35 (Thom Brooks & Martha C. 
Nussbaum eds., 2015). 
114 Obviously, religious texts are also commonly accessible via any smartphone 
technology to which jurors retain access. 
115 Such a possible line is considered and rejected in e.g., United States v. Lara-
Ramirez, 519 F.3d 76, 87–89 (1st Cir. 2008); Ackerman v. State, 737 So. 2d 1145, 
1148 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Hamilton, 574 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 1991)) 
(“It is clear . . . that the mere presence of a Bible in the jury room during 
deliberations does not require reversal.”), appeal denied, 751 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1999). 
But courts often try to draw a line between all “external” influences on deliberations, 
and all “internal” such influences. Consider the jury instruction at issue in People v. 
Mincey, 827 P.2d 388, 425 (Cal. 1992) (barring from the jury room essentially any 
writing, but allowing “your background, your heritage, your training” to play a role). 
116 See, e.g., Perkins v. State, 144 So. 3d 457, 496 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012) (“[T]he 
use of a Bible during deliberations constitutes an external [and therefore 
presumptively improper] influence on the jury.”), cert denied, 144 So. 3d 457 (Ala. 
2014). But cf. Robinson v. Polk, 438 F.3d 350, 363–64 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he reading 
of Bible passages invites the listener to examine his or her own conscience from 
within, [and thus] is not an ‘external’ influence.”), reh’g denied, 444 F.3d 225 (4th 
Cir. 2006), cert denied, 549 U.S. 1003 (2006). The decision also declined to 
distinguish between reading from the text of a Bible and quoting the Bible from 
memory. 
117 See Monica K. Miller et al., Bibles in the Jury Room: Psychological Theories 
Question Judicial Assumptions, 39 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 579, 604 (2013) (“[O]bjects in 
one’s immediate environment can influence behavior.”). More broadly, see NISBETT, 
supra note 14, at 34–49 (on the often unrecognized power of seemingly 
inconsequential elements of one’s situation or circumstances). 
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profitably focus on more overt cases, in which possible effects on 
broad epistemic peerhood are more conspicuously implicated. 
Thus it has been observed, for example, that “[s]ome jurors 
may view biblical texts like the Leviticus passage . . . as a factual 
representation of God’s will. . . . [and] as a legal instruction, 
issuing from God, requiring a particular and mandatory 
punishment for murder.”118  Invoking, preemptively, a 
purportedly universally binding divine commandment clearly 
raises various questions of epistemic peerhood. 
In particular, a juror’s overt assertion of a divine revelation 
with regard to defendant guilt or innocence,119 as distinct from, 
say, merely generally consulting her conscience, is problematic 
from the standpoint of epistemic peerhood.  A particular juror’s 
settled determination that divine law should override any 
conflicting civil law120 only heightens the importance of the 
epistemic peerhood issues thereby raised.  How is such a juror to 
react to the contrary views of other jurors?  How could such a 
juror take conflicting views seriously?  We might refer to these 
sorts of cases as involving a preemptive “religious override.” 
The problem is thus that a juror’s invoking a supposed 
infallible, divinely ordained resolution to a case, civil law to the 
contrary, implies a preemptive denial of relevant epistemic 
peerhood to one’s fellow jurors, and perhaps a denial of any 
meaningful epistemic status at all to distinctly skeptical jurors.  
The realistic possibility of relevant persuasion by skeptical fellow 
jurors is apparently already ruled out.  The otherwise reasonable 
relevant reflections of such fellow jurors cannot, generally, 
matter. 
It is assumed by some current philosophers that basic 
religious disputes in general only rarely involve genuine 
epistemic peerhood, let alone mutually acknowledged epistemic 
peerhood.121  In part, this may be a matter of religious believers 
 
118 People v. Harlan, 109 P.3d 616, 632 (Colo. 2005). 
119 See Young v. State, 12 P.3d 20, 48–49 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000) (citing State v. 
DeMille, 756 P.2d 81 (Utah 1988)) (finding no “outside influence sufficient” to taint 
the jury verdict). 
120 See Oliver v. Quarterman, 541 F.3d 329, 333 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding an 
external and improper influence on the jury, but no cognizable prejudice to the 
defendant therefrom), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1181 (2009). 
121 See, e.g., Nathan L. King, Religious Skepticism and Higher-Order Evidence, 
in 7 OXFORD STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 126, 130 (Jonathan Kvavig 
ed., 2016) (noting that typical cases of religious disagreement are not cases of peer 
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and nonbelievers fundamentally disagreeing as to what can 
properly count as meaningful evidence, or as sound and 
permissible reasoning, from one’s premises to a conclusion.122  We 
need not take a stand either way on such a broad dispute.  It is 
still possible for us to argue that epistemic peerhood can exist 
and can be mutually acknowledged between religiously-minded 
and secularly-minded persons on important legal issues.123 
There are important differences between broadly political 
and law-related discussions in the public square, and the much 
narrower context of the proper functioning of particular civil and 
criminal juries.  For many religious and metaphysical believers, 
the most important broad goal is to obtain what we might call 
“epistemic accreditation,” or meaningful access as widely 
acknowledged peers to the public square and the broad debates 
therein, without any need to crucially distort their message.  The 
crucial goal is thus often the opportunity to make a dialogic 
contribution to ongoing general public discussion, rather than, 
even by implication, to impeach or deny the epistemic 
competence and peerhood of one’s more secular or less 
metaphysically-oriented fellow speakers. 
The jury cases noted above thus present crucially different 
concerns in an importantly different context.124  If one believes, 
as a juror, in one’s distinctive access to specific and binding 
instructions from a source one unshakeably takes to be infallible, 
such as to override any contrary perspective, then one simply 
cannot regard some or many of one’s fellow jurors as epistemic 
peers.125  One can wish them well, empathize with them, respect 
them as persons, or patiently listen with mere curiosity or for 
some other extrinsic reason.  But the latter such jurors cannot, 
on one’s own assumptions, be rightly recognized in this context 
as one’s epistemic peers. 
 
disagreement); see also James Kraft, How Common Are Epistemic Peers in Religious 
Disagreement? Nathan King’s Talk at Recent Conference, PHIL. RELIGIOUS 
KNOWLEDGE (May 30, 2012), www.philosophical-religious-knowledge.com/2012/05/ 
30/epistemic-peers; Wald, supra note 53, at 115–16. 
122 See supra note 121. 
123 See Robert Audi, Religious Reasons and the Liberty of Citizens: The 
Integration of the Religious and the Secular in Kent Greenawalt’s Religion and the 
Constitution, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 249, 255 (2008). 
124 See supra notes 115–120 and accompanying text. 
125 See supra notes 115–120 and accompanying text. 
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Crucially, the legal system in return cannot generally 
validate and accommodate such a denial of epistemic peerhood to 
some or most of one’s fellow jurors.  An individual juror may 
believe that a specific divine command—bearing overriding 
epistemic authority—requires that the otherwise applicable civil 
law be overridden.126  But the civil law cannot, without paradox, 
ordain that the civil law itself be thus overridden within the 
jurisdiction it claims.  Even the phenomenon of principled, 
perhaps equal protection-based, jury nullification is, in this 
sense, within the contemplation of the broad legal system.127 
Whether the law chooses to regard juror reliance on 
purported divine revelation as “internal” or “external” to the jury 
deliberation,128 the law can hardly choose to validate jury 
deliberative processes that explicitly set aside the civil law in all 
its breadth and scope.  Legal decisions, including decisions as to 
defendant guilt or innocence and punishment, may inevitably 
incorporate moral, metaphysical, and even, in a loose sense, 
religious elements.129  But legal decision making can hardly, as a 
matter of due process and logic, simply default, within its own 
sphere, to a fundamental rejection of civil law. 
The value of broad, inclusive epistemic peerhood is, in the 
“religious override” cases, thus reinforced by the most elemental 
considerations of due process, fair trials, and the rule of law.  As 
one court has concluded, “In pluralistic America, the jury room 
must remain a place of common ground firmly rooted in law.”130 
Beyond the jury context, we now turn to the importance and 
value of a similarly broad, encompassing, inclusive approach to 
acknowledging epistemic peerhood in the campus affirmative 
action and diversity cases referred to immediately below. 
 
 
126 See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
127 For background, see Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black 
Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 705, 715 (1995). 
128 See supra notes 115–120. 
129 Consider the overlap, or the reinforcing effects, of civil and religious 
prohibitions of murder, theft, perjury, and other societal harms, as distinct from 
esoteric religious dogmas. For an extended defense of the incorporation of moral 
considerations into law, see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 225–75 (1986). 
130 Robinson v. Polk, 444 F.3d 225, 227 (4th Cir. 2006) (Wilkinson, J., 
concurring). A proper epistemic regard for one’s fellow jurors’ insights is linked to 
the rule of law and to specific constitutional rights, including Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendment procedural due process rights and Sixth Amendment fair trial rights. 
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IV. EPISTEMIC PEERHOOD IN THE CONTEXT OF CAMPUS 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND DIVERSITY 
The college campus environment presents distinctive 
possibilities for changes of one’s perspective.  Minds are, in 
general, more open to change “when individuals find themselves 
in a new environment, surrounded by peers of a different 
persuasion.”131  This possibility, among others, is recognized in 
the major United States Supreme Court judicial cases addressing 
issues of campus affirmative action and diversity. 
Thus, in the well-known Grutter v. Bollinger law-school-
admissions case, the Supreme Court recognized that “classroom 
discussion is livelier, more spirited, and simply more 
enlightening and interesting when the students have the 
greatest possible variety of backgrounds.”132  More recently, the 
Court has endorsed a university admissions goal of seeking “to 
provide an academic environment that offers a robust exchange 
of ideas, exposure to differing cultures . . . and acquisition of 
competencies required of future leaders.”133 
In connection with these legal cases, scholars have suggested 
that campus discussions involving persons of different races and 
different experiential backgrounds, and thus often of different 
perspectives and judgments, can “produce the most careful 
thinking.”134  As well, “[s]tudents learn more and think in deeper, 
more complex ways in a diverse educational environment.”135 
These upgrades in the quality of class and campus discussion 
are neatly analyzable under the rubric of either acknowledging, 
or denying, epistemic peerhood to fellow students and to 
 
131 HOWARD GARDNER, CHANGING MINDS: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF CHANGING 
OUR OWN AND OTHER PEOPLE’S MINDS 62 (2004). Professor Gardner refers 
specifically to the college campus environment. See id. 
132 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (internal quotations omitted). 
133 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2211 (2016) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
134 Expert Report of Kent D. Syverud, U. MICH. ADMISSIONS LAWSUITS, 
http://diversity.umich.edu/admissions/legal/expert/syverud.html (last updated Sept. 
5, 2012). 
135 Expert Report of Patricia Gurin, U. MICH. ADMISSIONS LAWSUITS, 
http://diversity.umich.edu/admissions/legal/expert/theor.html (last updated Sept. 5, 
2012); see also Anthony T. Kronman, Is Diversity a Value in American Higher 
Education?, 52 FLA. L. REV. 861, 875–76 (2000) (describing a class of students with 
diverse background experiences and perspectives as “a more fertile ground to 
cultivate the liberal aptitudes” and as more likely to better develop the “student’s 
imaginative powers”). 
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prospective students.  These processes of acknowledging or 
denying epistemic peerhood operate first at the university or 
institutional level, including through university admissions 
policies, and then at the level of teacher-student, inter-group, 
and student-to-student interactions. 
Thus, typical forms of racism—whether institutional or 
personal, overt or subconscious, subtle or crude, malicious or 
paternalistic—amount to unjustifiable denials of epistemic 
peerhood in the relevant respects.  Such denials are analyzable in 
terms of the various distinct approaches to epistemic peerhood 
briefly catalogued above.136 
For example, a student from a middle-class background 
might rightly conclude that students from working-class or 
poverty-associated backgrounds will tend not to have literally the 
same sorts of experiences, encounters, observations, perspectives, 
and inferences as that middle-class student.  So if we choose, 
improperly, to define epistemic peerhood in terms of as having 
the same experiences, and the same experience-processing 
capacities, as another person,137 then an unjustified denial of 
epistemic peerhood, in the relevant respects, will follow. 
But for our purposes, there is no reason to adopt such an 
arbitrarily and unrealistically narrow understanding of the 
requirements of epistemic peerhood.  It would instead be an 
improvement, in our legal context, to focus not on sameness, but 
on some version of equality of background experiences and 
experience processing-capacity.138 
The idea of precise equality of background evidence, 
experiences, and processing capacities may be, unavoidably, a 
remarkably complex inquiry, diminishing its realistic usefulness.  
Some of the complexity can be reduced by focusing, more 
usefully, not on any version of precise epistemic equality, but 
instead on something like rough equality,139 or on practical 
epistemic equality for the similarly practical purposes at hand.140 
 
 
136 See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text. 
137 See supra note 52. 
138 See supra note 53. 
139 See supra note 54. 
140 For a crude, or at least an openly pragmatic, version of rough interpersonal 
equality as the basis for important political inferences, see HOBBES, supra notes 19–
21 and accompanying text. 
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But in truth, even the idea of rough or approximate equality 
as the criterion for epistemic peerhood again may not quite 
capture our best sense of the relevant epistemic differences.  Do 
we wish to say, precisely, that the relevant background 
experiences of persons who have grown up in material poverty 
and those who have not, or of those who have been subject to 
chronic discrimination and those who have not, are roughly 
equal, in some genuinely quantitatively measurable sense, even 
with some specified margin of error?  Would we not thereby 
pretend to some degree of neutral and objective measurability 
that is really not available? 
More appropriate, and with equal or better implications for 
the case for broad, encompassing, inclusive epistemic peerhood, 
would be a focus instead on what we have called the realistic 
noncomparability, or incommensurability, of relevant 
background experiences.141  Such a partial incomparability of 
experiences is then set in a largely uncontroversial and more 
basic presumption, on one theory or another, of the underlying 
more fundamental equality of all persons.142 
Consider, by way of loose analogy, that we might want to say 
that a certain kind of wisdom and a certain kind of benevolence 
are not quantitatively of equal value, or even of roughly equal 
value, but instead both of great, but incommensurable, value.  
Or, more concretely, we might not want to say that a particular 
sculpture and a particular musical composition are 
quantitatively equal, or even nearly equal, in artistic value, but 
instead that their individual great values cannot be put on some 
neutral, objective, common numerical scale. 
In the case of the noncomparable virtues, and of the 
noncomparable works of art, our sense of noncomparability on 
any objective common scale need not and should not leave us in a 
position of epistemic skepticism.  We need not be left with 
arbitrariness.  The much better justified approach is instead to 
apply our admittedly limited human capacities for empathy, 
humility, sensible judgment, and imagination.143  We may then 
be more open to the possibility that our own experiences and 
those of our neighbors with regard to, say, local police practices, 
 
141 See supra notes 55, 62–64 and accompanying text. 
142 See the substantial literature referred to in Wright, Equal Protection and the 
Idea of Equality, supra note 61, at 45–53. 
143 See supra notes 55, 62–64 and accompanying text. 
FINAL_WRIGHT 3/25/2018  6:18 PM 
692 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:663   
public bureaucracies, court systems, credit agencies, lessors, 
employment opportunities, physical safety, sales practices, or 
health care access and treatment may not be the same, and, 
crucially, that our own experiences and perceptions may not be 
uniquely legitimate or valuable. 
This inclusive approach to epistemic peerhood then 
specifically supports various forms of campus pluralism and 
diversity as contributing to better, and more informed, 
discussion, debate, and broad problem solving.  We shall see that 
research suggests, for example, that enhanced quality of group 
decision making, in our various legal contexts, need not take the 
form of the providing of utterly new ideas by diverse group 
members.  In many instances, a relatively subtle, ongoing, 
perhaps awkward, discussion process instead unfolds.  In this 
process, diverse group members often inspire a greater degree of 
group deliberative openness, innovation, conscientiousness, 
greater information exchange, and thoroughness in examining 
the range of interpretations and perspectives, thoughtfulness, 
and generally more defensible deliberative outcomes.144  Such a 
process requires the meaningful acknowledgement of and 
epistemic respect for persons of different experiential 
backgrounds and perspectives.145 
To some degree, an open, inclusive, and expansive approach 
to recognizing those with different experiential backgrounds as 
epistemic peers tracks the basic idea of the “wisdom of crowds” 
and the more specifically developed literature on even more 
effective group decision making.146  From that literature, we 
appreciate that in many problem-solving contexts, a group of 
 
144 See Katherine W. Phillips, How Diversity Makes Us Smarter, SCI. AM. (Oct. 
1, 2014), www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-diversity-makes-us-smarter. These 
effects are not in the slightest confined to discussions of what one would think of as 
distinctly racial substantive issues. See, e.g., Better Decisions Through Diversity, 
KELLOGG INSIGHT (Oct. 1, 2010), https://insight.kellogg.northwestern.edu/article/ 
better_decisions_through_diversity; see also Anthony Lising Antonio et al., Effects of 
Racial Diversity on Complex Thinking in College Students, STAN. U. (2004), 
http://web.stanford.edu/~aantonio/psychsci.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2018). More 
broadly, see Michel Zaitouni & Amani Gaber, Managing Workforce Diversity from 
the Perspective of Two Higher Education Institutions, 18 INT’L J. OF BUS. MGMT. 
(2017). These effects can to one degree or another be affected by how the decision-
making group is externally managed. See Fernando Martin-Alcazar et al., Effects of 
Diversity on Group Decision-Making Processes: The Moderating Role of Human 
Resource Management, 21 GROUP DECISION & NEGOT. 677 (2012). 
145 See Phillips, supra note 144. 
146 See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text. 
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diverse, independent, conflicting, contrarian, and dissenting 
persons is often likely to outperform a small group of presumably 
epistemically elite experts.147  Again, self-identified minority or 
dissenting contributors may be of even greater value than merely 
independent-minded persons in improving group decision 
making.148 
In particular, in some cases, additional group decision-
making accuracy can be gained not by considering anyone’s 
degree of confidence in their own judgments, but by giving weight 
to a somewhat different consideration.149  Additional accuracy can 
sometimes be had by giving some additional weight to the 
judgments of persons who believe that their own best judgments 
are not likely to correspond to the judgment of the group’s 
numerical majority,150 especially where such modest judgments 
turn out nonetheless to be more popular than their holders had 
expected.151  This partly reflects the more basic fact that on many 
questions, some subgroups will have distinctive, legitimate 
insights that they reasonably do not expect to be widely shared, 
or held by a numerical majority.152 
The example the study authors in question actually refer to 
involves naming the capital of Pennsylvania.153  As it happens, 
typically, more people will answer “Philadelphia,” incorrectly, 
than will answer, correctly, “Harrisburg.”154  The basic point is 
that people who answer “Philadelphia” will tend to assume that 
most other respondents will give the same answer.  In contrast, 
the limited number of persons whose own answer is “Harrisburg” 
will tend, understandably, to anticipate that a substantial 
percentage of persons will make the mistake of choosing the 
much larger, more famous city of Philadelphia.155  Thus, in part 
the contrast between one’s own judgment based on one’s own 
 
147 See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text. 
148 See supra note 43. 
149 See Dražen Prelec et al., supra note 43, at 533. 
150 See id.; Peter Dizikes, Better Wisdom from Crowds, MIT NEWS (Jan. 25, 
2017), http://news.mit.edu/2017/algorithm-better-wisdom-crowds-0125. Consider, for 
example, the case of a small group of people who believe, correctly, that Carson City, 
Nevada is west of Los Angeles, but who also believe that many people would not 
agree. 
151 See supra notes 149–150. 
152 See supra notes 149–150. 
153 See Dizikes, supra note 150. 
154 See id. 
155 See id. 
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special knowledge and experience, and one’s sense that not many 
others, lacking that knowledge and experience, will concur in 
one’s own judgment, adds especially distinctive weight and value 
to that judgment. 
This further refinement, beyond the independence and 
especially the contrariness of one’s perspective, has implications 
for the extension of epistemic peerhood in the campus affirmative 
action and diversity contexts.156  In many important contexts, the 
lived experiences, inferences, memories, and judgments of many 
minority students will tend to be distinctive, in the sense of being 
not widely shared or vividly envisioned by many nonminority 
students.  And in many such cases, the relevant minority group 
members will tend also to believe that their experiences will not 
be credited by large numbers of nonminorities.157 
Crucially for our current purposes, such experiential 
minorities tend to amount as well to a distinct numerical 
minority on campus.  A relevant campus issue discussion thus 
tends to place minority group, and numerical minority 
discussants, with distinctive, largely-unshared, experiences, in a 
distinctively valuable epistemic position.158 
Doubtless the lived experiences of nonminority students in 
general are in themselves generally equally valid and legitimate.  
But a substantial number of such majority students will also 
tend to assume that their basic experiences and inferences 
therefrom will be mainstream, and relatively broadly shared, at 
least by a numerical majority.159  Their own perspectives, 
however legitimate, may thus tend to contribute less to further 
enhancing the quality of the basic “wisdom of crowds” decision-
making process.160  This effect constitutes yet a further reason for 
a broad, expansive, inclusive sense of epistemic peerhood in the 
contexts of campus affirmative action and diversity. 
 
156 See supra notes 41–43. 
157 See, e.g., Richard Tapia & Cynthia Johnson, Minority Students in Science 
and Math: What Universities Still Do Not Understand about Race in America, in 
DOCTORAL EDUCATION AND THE FACULTY OF THE FUTURE 123 (Ronald G. Ehrenberg 
& Charlotte V. Kuh eds., 2009); EVE FINE & JO HANDELSMAN, WISELI, BENEFITS 
AND CHALLENGES OF DIVERSITY IN ACADEMIC SETTINGS, (2d ed., 2010) 
https://wiseli.engr.wisc.edu/docs/Benefits_Challenges.pdf. 
158 See supra notes 149–150 and accompanying text. 
159 See Dizikes, supra note 150. 
160 See supra notes 41–43, 149–150 and accompanying text. 
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The case for an expanded sense of epistemic peerhood in 
campus discussion contexts operates crucially at individual, 
group, and institutional levels.161  A broad acknowledgement of 
epistemic peerhood at institutional levels may encourage 
individual reassessments of who should count as one’s epistemic 
peer as well.  But there is also a more direct responsibility for all 
individuals, based on the available evidence and on 
considerations of fairness, to take the initiative in reexamining 
and expanding, where appropriate, their sense of who should 
count as an epistemic peer.162 
As our final illustrative legal context, we briefly consider 
below the appropriate scope of acknowledged epistemic peerhood 
in the distinctively different, but certainly important, context of 
decision making by administrative agencies and by courts 
reviewing agency decision making. 
V. EPISTEMIC PEERHOOD IN THE CONTEXT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY DECISION MAKING 
Many issues associated with the relationships between 
administrative agency actors and reviewing courts cannot be 
reduced to questions of epistemic peerhood.  But administrative 
law issues increasingly involve remarkable subtlety and 
complexity of either a legal or a technical policy-making 
nature.163  Questions of epistemic peerhood, actual and 
acknowledged, between judges and administrative agency actors 
have therefore taken on correspondingly increased importance. 
Assumptions as to judicial and agency epistemic peerhood 
pervade the various contexts, and the corresponding judicial 
tests, of administrative agency decision making.  The substance, 
and the outcome, of any epistemic comparison between agency 
decision makers and reviewing courts will, of course, vary with 
the context and the judicial test applied.  Epistemic comparisons 
of agency decision makers and judges arise within the scope of 
any particular judicial test, as well.  Questions of the scope and 
 
161 See supra notes 132–135 and accompanying text. 
162 For a broad endorsement of active, reflective, critical self-awareness and a 
willingness to make corrective adjustments in attitudes that may in part reflect 
negative group prejudice, see MIRANDA FRICKER, EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE: POWER AND 
THE ETHICS OF KNOWING 91–92 (2007). 
163 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (stating that the 
complexity and scientific nature of often divisive policy issues as one of the reasons 
for the need to give great deference to the decisions of administrative agencies). 
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limits of epistemic peerhood thus recur within and between each 
of the familiar legal tests that affect the scope and weight of 
decision-making authority exercised by judges and 
administrative agency actors.164  We see these questions of 
epistemic peerhood played out more concretely in the typical 
judicial review scenarios referred to below. 
The best-known context in which such epistemic peerhood 
issues arise is probably Chevron deference cases.165  In 
appropriate cases, Chevron calls for substantial judicial deference 
to agency decisions.166  This deference is not simply a reflection of 
a congressional desire for such deference, but partly a judicial 
and even a congressional acknowledgement of the epistemic 
peerhood, if not the epistemic superiority in a given context, of 
agency decision makers, even in some cases of empirical 
uncertainty. 
Chevron itself involved interpreting vague statutory 
language in an area of technical and policy-consequence 
complexity.  The path toward optimal air pollution reduction was 
disputable, even with partisan politics and interest group 
maneuvering somehow set aside.167  Reasonable policy disputes 
flourished, even among relevant experts of various sorts.168  In 
such a case, we obviously cannot say that judges should 
acknowledge a nonexistent agency policy conclusion that is 
uncontroversial among all agency experts.  But a reasonable 
epistemic humility169 counsels, in such cases, an awareness on 
the part of reviewing judges that they may genuinely understand 
relatively little of a relevant technical nature.170  Or, that they 
may know just enough to be unintentionally arbitrary 
themselves, if not dangerous, in failing to defer to those 
 
164 See id. at 865–66 (discussing the relative weights of authority to be given to 
decisions made by administrative agencies, Congress, and the Judiciary). 
165 See id. at 842–45. 
166 See id. at 844. 
167 See id. at 847. 
168 See id. at 863–65. 
169 See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text. 
170 See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Bazelon, J., 
concurring) (“[I]n cases of great technological complexity, the best way for courts to 
guard against unreasonable or erroneous administrative decisions is not for the 
judges themselves to scrutinize the technical merits of each decision,” as opposed to 
judicially requiring appropriately careful agency procedural steps in decision 
making), cert denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). 
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administrative agency actors.171  It is those agency actors who are 
most likely to eventually develop a more securely justified policy 
in the future, if they are left with appropriate experimental 
discretion.172 
Thus, Chevron deference is in some measure a matter of 
contextualized differences between courts and agency personnel 
in what is thought to be relevant accumulating experience and 
expertise,173 if not in the actual current possession of likely right 
answers.174  Thus, for example, even where a court has held an 
agency interpretation of a statutory phrase to be reasonable but 
not legally required, a later and quite different agency 
interpretation of that same statutory phrase will, 
understandably, generally control over the judicial determination 
of the reasonableness of the prior, now revised agency 
interpretation of the statute.175 
 
171 See id. at 66–67 (“[S]ubstantive review of mathematical and scientific 
evidence by technically illiterate judges is dangerously unreliable . . . .”). Cf. id. at 68 
(Leventhal, J., concurring) (“Our present system of review assumes judges will 
acquire whatever technical knowledge is necessary as background for decision of the 
legal questions.”). Of course, this latter approach may in some cases involve a touch 
of epistemic arrogance. By contrast, see sources cited supra notes 16–17, 70. 
172 See Ethyl, 541 F.2d at 67 (Bazelon, J., concurring). 
173 For a clear example, see Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 
2196–97 (2014) (involving a particularly complex statutory scheme involving foreign 
affairs). See also FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW 
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 232 n.30 (2009) (describing the justifications 
for Chevron’s holding based on agency technical expertise and “conservation of 
scarce, expensive judicial resources”); Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Without Deference, 81 
MO. L. REV. 1075, 1075 (2016) (noting arguments bearing upon agency technical 
expertise as well as political accountability). Actually, though, the precise issue may 
often not be one of the “absolute” advantage of agencies over courts, but the more 
technical “comparative” advantage of either. See R. George Wright, At What Is the 
Supreme Court Comparatively Advantaged?, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 535, 538 (2013) 
[hereinafter Wright, At What Is the Supreme Court Comparatively Advantaged?]. 
174 Where the issue is not so much the reasonableness of an agency’s 
interpretation of an ambiguous statutory phrase, but of choosing among possible 
responses to a more free-floating perceived social problem, the courts may similarly 
defer to evolving agency experience, if not to demonstrable agency expertise. See, 
e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513, 515 (2009) (regarding 
an agency’s policy change from a “fleeting expletive” safe harbor rule to a more 
contextualized approach, the agency “need not demonstrate to a court’s satisfaction 
that the reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for the old one”) 
(emphasis in original). 
175 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 
982 (2005). This policy also serves the further value of an agency-controlled, 
centralized, national uniformity of interpretation of the particular statutory 
language, as distinct from different and conflicting interpretations in different 
federal circuits. 
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On the other hand, classic Chevron deference176 may not be 
granted, or may be judged insufficient to validate an agency’s 
judgment, when an agency’s claim to epistemic superiority seems 
to the reviewing court to be dubious, as in cases of an agency’s 
supposed failure to attempt to explain some policy change,177 or 
in cases of unexplained apparent agency irrationality in 
interpretation,178 or in cases involving policy questions of unusual 
breadth and importance that do not fall uniquely within the 
scope of the particular agency’s expertise.179  These 
considerations, too, reflect judicial, if not also congressional, 
judgments as to the agency’s relative epistemic competence.180 
The importance of perceived relative expertise of agencies 
and courts is not confined, though, to the Chevron deference 
cases.  Whether a reviewing court should apply relatively high 
level Chevron deference or what is often thought of as a 
somewhat lower level of deference to agency judgments can also 
sometimes turn on questions of comparative agency expertise 
and the complexity of the regulatory process.181 
The most typical form of less expansive judicial deference to 
agency judgments in these contexts is known as Skidmore 
deference.182  Skidmore deference recognizes that some agency 
 
176 Chevron’s step one, as distinguished from Chevron’s step two, does not 
involve any reference to an agency’s interpretation of the statute; the focus instead 
is on the court’s attempt to determine whether Congress somehow indicated a 
specific, unequivocal, nonoverridable intent on the precise interpretive question at 
stake in the case. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
177 See, e.g., Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125–26 (2016) 
(stating that an unexplained agency interpretive inconsistency is undeserving of 
Chevron deference). 
178 See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015) (declaring the 
agency’s failure, in the particular statutory context, to consider cost factors to be 
unreasonable under Chevron step two and thus undeserving of Chevron deference). 
179 See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89, 2483 (2015) (declining to 
apply Chevron deference due to a presumed lack of congressional intent to delegate 
authority to the IRS to determine the matter at issue, given both the “deep ‘economic 
and political significance’ that is central to this statutory scheme,” and the presumed 
fact that “the IRS . . . has no expertise in crafting health insurance policy of this 
sort”). 
180 But note the ambiguity between an agency’s “absolute advantage” and the 
more technical idea of “comparative advantage” in working through a given problem, 
or type of problem. For background, see generally Wright, At What Is the Supreme 
Court Comparatively Advantaged?, supra note 173. 
181 See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002); see also Fox v. Clinton, 684 
F.3d 67, 78 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
182 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944). 
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judgments may be “based upon more specialized experience and 
broader investigations and information than is likely to come to a 
judge in a particular case.”183  Such cases starkly pose issues of 
epistemic peerhood—or of epistemic superiority and inferiority—
between administrative officials and federal judges. 
Skidmore, however, then crucially authorizes reviewing 
courts to consider, in appropriate cases, the apparent 
thoroughness of the agency’s consideration of the matter, the 
apparent validity of the agency’s reasoning, and the apparent 
consistency or inconsistency of the agency’s judgment on the 
particular matter over time.184  The court’s judgment as to the 
validity or invalidity of the agency’s reasoning crucially depends 
upon that court’s assessment of the presence or absence of their 
relevant epistemic peerhood with respect to the agency in 
question,185 on any judicial sense of appropriate judicial epistemic 
humility,186 and finally on any sense of a lack of relevant agency 
competence or expertise.187 
Similar epistemic considerations play as well into cases in 
which a court is reviewing an agency’s interpretation not of a 
congressional statute, but of an agency’s interpretation of the 
agency’s own preexisting rule.  This is commonly referred to as 
 
183 Id. at 139. 
184 See id. 
185 In his account of the relations under Skidmore between agencies and courts, 
Professor Vermeule has used the term “epistemic deference.” ADRIAN VERMEULE, 
LAW’S ABNEGATION: FROM LAW’S EMPIRE TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 200 (2016). 
186 See supra notes 16–17, 70 and accompanying text. For a further sense of the 
institutional epistemic comparison often licensed by Skidmore, see United States v. 
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001) (under Skidmore, “an agency’s interpretation 
may merit some deference whatever its form, given the specialized experience and 
broader investigations and information available to the agency”) (internal quotation 
omitted); see also Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (on the 
judicial obligation to respect agency interpretive judgments, “but only to the extent 
that those interpretations have the power to persuade”) (internal quotation omitted). 
For a judicial acknowledgement of the value, in some contexts, of administrative 
day-to-day expertise, see NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944). 
Note also Hearst’s distinction between broad legal questions on the one hand and 
more contextualized, specific questions of applying broad law to distinctive facts on 
the other, see id. at 130–31, as well as the Court’s reference elsewhere to the 
significance of an agency’s relying, or not relying, in a given case, on its “experience 
and peculiar competence,” SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 92 (1943). 
187 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 269 (2006) (granting no judicial 
deference to the agency even under Skidmore, given the epistemic factors of the 
administrative actor’s “lack of expertise in this area and the apparent absence of any 
consultation” outside the agency). 
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Auer deference.188  Whether to judicially accord Auer deference to 
agency interpretations of their own rules may take into account 
whether the agency’s underlying regulation involves “a complex 
and highly technical regulatory program, in which the 
classification of relevant criteria necessarily require significant 
expertise.”189  Auer deference, on the other hand, may not be 
accorded to an agency interpretation where the court disagrees 
with the agency on grounds of constitutional or jurisprudential 
principle,190 or on some narrower grounds,191 at least apparently 
impeaching the epistemic peerhood or the epistemic virtue of the 
agency in a given case.192 
In general, and taking all the above contexts into account, 
courts and agencies generally would be well advised to broadly 
acknowledge each other’s epistemic peerhood within the 
constraints of the division of labor envisioned by separation of 
powers principles, and by principles of comparative advantage.  
This general or presumptive epistemic peerhood of courts and 
agencies commonly will not take the form of their epistemic 
sameness,193 or of their concrete, substantive epistemic equality194 
 
188 See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); see also Decker v. Nw. Envtl. 
Def. Ctr. 568 U.S. 597, 613–14 (2013); Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 
50, 59 (2011); Chase Bank, USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 562 U.S. 195, 209–10 (2011). 
189 Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (internal 
quotation omitted). 
190 See, e.g., United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Bible, 136 S. Ct. 1607, 1608–09 
(2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (raising concerns as to possible agency usurpation, 
insufficient separation of powers, insufficient decisional predictability, and agency 
arbitrariness). 
191 See, e.g., Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155 (2012) 
(citing, among other grounds for not according Auer deference, a judicial judgment 
that the agency’s own judgment is “plainly erroneous” (quoting Auer, 461 U.S. at 
461) and finding in Christopher an unrecognized “unfair surprise” to reasonably 
relying regulated parties). 
192 It should be noted that issues of judiciary or agency epistemic peerhood can 
arise as well, even in cases of constitutional procedural due process when the 
fairness, fact-finding adequacy, or even the comparative cost effectiveness of the 
agency decision-making process is called into question. See Adrian Vermeule, 
Deference and Due Process, Essay, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1890, 1893 (2016). For 
background, see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976). But see Forsyth 
County v. The Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992) (according far less 
procedural due process deference to a local agency’s parade-permitting practices). 
Finally, courts will often defer, largely from a sense of epistemic deference, or 
reasonable epistemic humility, to many agency choices as to whether to proceed by 
general rulemaking or by successive case adjudication. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 
332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947). 
193 See supra note 52. 
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in a given case, or even of rough or approximate equality.195  
Instead, agencies and courts take broad epistemic peerhood in 
the most interesting form of offsetting realms of relative 
expertise, and of what we have called epistemic noncomparability 
or incommensurability.196 
Thus, the broad epistemic respect owed by agencies and 
courts to one another is based largely on the noncomparability of 
their diverse perspectives and experiences and their only 
partially overlapping realms of relevant and developed expertise.  
As a first approximation, for example, we should realistically 
expect administrative agencies to focus more on their own 
distinct regulatory mission than on how that mission fits with, or 
is properly limited by, the broader legal and constitutional 
environment.  Dedicated agency experts with a given mission 
may tend to undervalue broader, big picture considerations.  
Agency experts may not also be legal generalists.  This is where 
reviewing courts should hold an absolute, and perhaps a 
comparative, epistemic advantage over even agency experts.197 
But as we have also seen throughout this Part, agencies may 
bring evolving substantive expertise to a legal issue that cannot 
be matched by, or even fully explained to, a generalist reviewing 
court.  Federal courts of appeal must devote most of their 
attention to matters other than administrative law and related 
policies.  Even when the agency is itself uncertain, at least for 
the moment, as to some technical or empirical question, judicial 
epistemic humility, and a division of labor based on epistemic 
incommensurability, suggest that courts should not typically 
override even uncertain, but conscientiously derived, agency 
conclusions. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has deployed the somewhat technical idea of 
epistemic peerhood in the sense, roughly, of persons or groups 
who deserve, in context, to be considered full members of a 
decision-making community.  The idea of epistemic peerhood 
illuminates and constructively addresses decision-making 
pathologies and inefficiencies in many legal contexts.  The 
 
194 See supra note 53. 
195 See supra note 54. 
196 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
197 See supra note 173. 
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primary focus herein has been on civil and criminal jury decision 
making in general and cases of juror recourse to purported divine 
revelation; campus affirmative action, diversity, and the campus 
educational process; and the division of authority between 
administrative agencies and courts that review agency decision 
making.  Reflection on these legal contexts and on the available 
empirical evidence has suggested that we are typically best 
advised to adopt broad, encompassing, and inclusive approaches 
to questions of whom we should recognize, for legal decision-
making purposes, as our epistemic peers. 
 
